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Abstract—A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy
in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a
receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random vari-
able. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message that
balances a trade-off between providing an accurate measurement
and minimizing the amount of leaked private information, which
is assumed to be correlated with the to-be-estimated variable. The
mutual information between the transmitted message and the
private information is used as a measure of the amount of leaked
information. An equilibrium is constructed and its properties are
investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Participatory and crowd-sensing technologies rely on honest
data from recruited users to generate estimates of variables,
such as traffic condition and network coverage. However,
providing accurate information by the users undermines their
privacy. For instance, a road user that provides her start and
finish points as well as the travel time to a participatory-
sensing scheme can significantly improve the quality of the
traffic estimation; however, such reports expose her private life.
Therefore, she benefits from providing “false” information, not
to deceive the system and disrupt the services but to protect
her privacy. The amount of the deviation from the truth is
determined by the value of privacy, which varies across the
population. To better understand this effect, here, we use a
game-theoretic framework to model the conflict of interest and
study the effect of privacy in strategic communication.
Specifically, we use a model in which the receiver is inter-
ested in estimating a random variable. To this aim, the receiver
ask a better-informed sender to provide a measurement of the
variable. The sender wants to find a trade-off between her de-
sire to provide an accurate measurement of the variable while
minimizing the amount of leaked private information, which
is potentially correlated with that variable. We assume that
the sender has access to a possibly noisy measurement of the
variable and a perfect measurement of her private information.
We use the mutual information between the communicated
message and the private information to capture the amount
of the leaked information. The sender balances between her
two desires using a privacy ratio. We present a numerical
algorithm for finding an equilibrium (i.e., policies from which
one has an incentive to unilaterally deviate) of the presented
game. We also construct an equilibrium explicitly for the case
where the message and the to-be-estimated variable belong
to the same space. Using a numerical example, we illustrate
the relationship between the quality of the estimation at the
receiver and the privacy ratio. In turns out that, at least for
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Fig. 1. Communication structure between the sender S and the receiver R.
the presented example, there exists a critical value for the
privacy ratio below which the sender honestly provides her
measurement of the variable.
Strategic communication has been studied in the economics
literature in the context of cheap-talk games [1]–[3] in which
well-informed senders communicates with a receiver that
makes a decision regarding the society’s welfare. In those
games, the sender(s) and the receiver have a clear conflict
of interest, which results in potentially dishonest messages.
Contrary to those studies, here, the conflict of interest is
motivated by the sense of privacy of the sender, which changes
the form of the cost functions. Furthermore, in this paper, we
are dealing with discrete random variables which is different
from the studies on cheap-talk games. Cheap-talk games were
recently adapted to investigate privacy in communication and
estimation [4]. That study, however, focuses quadratic cost
functions and Gaussian random variables. In this paper, we use
the mutual information as a measure of the leaked information
and study the more realistic setup of discrete communication
channels.
The problem considered in this paper is close, in essence,
to the idea of differential privacy and its application in
estimation and signal processing, e.g. [5]–[7]. Those studies
rely on adding noise, typically Laplace noises, to guarantee
the privacy of the users by making the outcome less sensitive
to local parameter variations. In contrast, here, we find the
optimal “amount of randomness” that needs to be introduced
into the system for preserving the privacy by modelling the
communication as a strategic game and studying its equilibria.
In the information theory literature, wiretap channels have
been studied heavily dating from the pioneering work in [8]. In
these problems, the sender wishes to devise encoding schemes
to create a secure channel for communicating with the receiver
while hiding her data from an eavesdropper. However, in
the privacy problem, the objective is different, that is, the
sender want to hide her private information (not necessarily
all the data possessed by her) from everyone including, but
not limited to, the receiver.
Note that information theory has been used in the past
in networked control under communication constraints, e.g.,
see [9]–[13]. However, to the best of our knowledge, it
has not been used to measure the privacy loss in strategic
communication as in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem
formulation is introduced in Section II. The equilibria of
the communication game are constructed in Section III. The
results are extended to the multi-sender case in Section IV.
Section V discusses the numerical example. The paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider strategic communication between a sender and
a receiver as depicted in Fig. 1. The receiver wants to have an
accurate measurement of a discrete random variable X ∈ X ,
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2where X denotes the set of all the possibilities. To this aim,
the receiver deploys a sensor (which is a part of the sender)
to provide a measurement of the variable. The measurement
is denoted by Z ∈ X . The sender also has another discrete
random variable denoted by W ∈ W , which is correlated
with X and/or Z. This random variable is the sender’s private
information, i.e., it is not known by the receiver. The sender
wants to transmit a message Y ∈ Y that contains useful
information about the measured variable while minimizing the
amount of the leaked private information (note that, because of
the correlation between W and X and/or Z, an honest report of
Z may shine some light on the realization of W ). Throughout
this paper, for notational consistency, we use capital letters
to denote the random variables, e.g., X , and small letters to
denote a value, e.g., x.
Assumption 1: The discrete random variables X,Z,W are
distributed according to a joint probability distribution p : X ×
X ×W → [0, 1], i.e., P{X = x, Z = z,W = w} = p(x, z, w)
for all (x, z, w) ∈ X × X ×W .
The conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver
can be modelled and analysed as a game. This conflict of
interest can manifest itself in the following ways:
1) In participatory-sensing schemes, the sender’s measurement
of the state potentially depends on the way that the sender
experiences the underlying process or services. For instance,
in traffic estimation, the sender’s measurement is fairly
accurate on the route that she has travelled and, thus, an
honest revelation of Z provides a window into the life of the
commuter. However, the underlying state X is not related
to the private information of sender W since she is only an
infinitesimal part of the traffic flow. In such a case, we have
P{X = x, Z = z,W = w}
= P{Z = z|X = x,W = w}P{X = x,W = w}
= P{Z = z|X = x,W = w}P{X = x}P{W = w},
where the second equality follows from independence of
random variables W and X .
2) In many services, such as buying insurance coverage or
participating in polling surveys, an individual should provide
an accurate history of her life or beliefs. In these cases, the
variable X highly depends on the private information of the
sender W (if not equal to it). In such cases,the measurement
Z may not contain any error as well.
In what follows, the privacy game is properly defined.
A. Receiver
The receiver constructs its best estimate Xˆ ∈ X using the
conditional distribution P{Xˆ = xˆ|Y = y} = βxˆy for all
(xˆ, y) ∈ X × Y . The matrix β = (βxˆy)(xˆ,y)∈X×Y ∈ B is the
policy of the receiver with the set of feasible policies defined as
B=
{
β :βxˆy ∈ [0, 1],∀(xˆ, y) ∈ X × Y &
∑
xˆ∈X
βxˆy=1,∀y ∈ Y
}
.
The receiver prefers an accurate measurement of the variable
X . Therefore, the receiver wants to minimize the cost function
E{d(X, Xˆ)} with the mapping d : X × X → R≥0 being a
measure of distance between the entries of set X . An example
of such a distance is
d(x, xˆ) =
{
0, x = xˆ,
1, x 6= xˆ. (1)
When using the distance mapping in (1), the term E{d(X, Xˆ)}
becomes the probability of error at the receiver. The results of
this paper are valid irrespective of the choice of this mapping.
B. Sender
The sender constructs its message y ∈ Y according to the
conditional probability distribution P{Y = y|Z = z,W =
w} = αyzw for all (y, z, w) ∈ Y × X × W . Therefore, the
tensor α = (αyzw)(y,z,w)∈Y×X×W ∈ A denotes the policy of
the sender. The set of feasible policies is given by
A =
{
α : αyzw ∈ [0, 1],∀(y, z, w) ∈ Y × X ×W
&
∑
y∈Y
αyzw = 1,∀(z, w) ∈ X ×W
}
.
The sender wants to minimize E{d(X, Xˆ)}+%I(Y ;W ), with
I(Y ;W ) denoting the mutual information between random
variables Y and W [14], to strike a balance between trans-
mitting useful information about the measured variable and
minimizing the amount of the leaked private information. In
this setup, the privacy ratio % captures the sender’s emphasis on
protecting her privacy. For small %, the sender provides a fairly
honest measurement of the state. However, as % increases, the
sender provides a less relevant message to avoid revealing her
private information through the communicated message.
C. Equilibria
The cost function of the sender is equal
U(α, β) = E{d(X, Xˆ)}+ %I(Y ;W ),
where
I(Y ;W ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
w∈W
P{Y = y,W = w}
× log
[
P{Y = y,W = w}
P{Y = y}P{W = w}
]
(2)
with P{Y = y} = ∑w∈W∑z∈X ∑x∈X αyzwp(x, z, w),
P{W = w} = ∑z∈X ∑x∈X p(x, z, w), and
P{Y = y,W = w} =
∑
z∈X
P{Y = y,W = w,Z = z}
=
∑
z∈X
P{Y = y|W = w,Z = z}
× P{W = w,Z = z}
=
∑
z∈X
∑
x∈X
αyzwp(x, z, w).
Moreover, we have
E{d(X, Xˆ)} =
∑
x∈X
∑
xˆ∈X
d(x, xˆ)P{Xˆ = xˆ, X = x}
3with
P{Xˆ = xˆ, X = x} =
∑
y∈Y
P{Xˆ = xˆ, X = x, Y = y}
=
∑
y∈Y
P{Xˆ = xˆ|X = x, Y = y}P{X = x, Y = y}
=
∑
y∈Y
βxˆy
∑
z∈X
∑
w∈W
P{Y = y|X = x, Z = z,W = w}
× P{X = x, Z = z,W = w}
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈X
∑
w∈W
βxˆyαyzwp(x, z, w).
Following these calculations, we can define mappings ξ : A×
B → R and ζ : A→ R such that
ξ(α, β) = E{d(X, Xˆ)}
=
∑
x∈X
∑
xˆ∈X
∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈X
∑
w∈W
d(x, xˆ)βxˆyαyzwp(x, z, w)
and
ζ(α) = I(Y ;W )
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
w∈W
(∑
z∈X
∑
x∈X
αyzwp(x, z, w)
)
× log
[ ∑
z∈X
∑
x∈X αyzwp(x, z, w)
(
∑
w∈W,z∈X ,x∈X αyzwp(x, z, w))P{W = w}
]
.
Therefore, we can rewrite the costs of the sender and the
receiver, respectively, as U(α, β) = ξ(α, β) + %ζ(α) and
V (α, β) = ξ(α, β). Now, we can properly define the equi-
librium of the game.
Definition 1: (Nash Equilibrium): A pair (α∗, β∗) ∈ A ×
B constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the privacy game if
(α∗, β∗) ∈ N with
N = {(α, β) ∈ A×B |U(α, β) ≤ U(α′, β),∀α′ ∈ A
V (α, β) ≤ V (α, β′),∀β′ ∈ B}.
Now, we are ready to present the results of the paper.
III. FINDING AN EQUILIBRIUM
As all signalling games [3], the privacy game admits a
family of trivial equilibria known as babbling equilibria in
which the sender’s message is independent of the to-be-
estimated variable and the receiver discards sender’s message.
Theorem 1: (Babbling Equilibria): Let α∗ ∈ A be such
that α∗yzw = 1/|Y| for all (y, z, w) ∈ Y × X × W .
Further, let β∗ ∈ B be such that β∗xˆy = 1 for xˆ ∈
arg maxx∈X
∑
z′∈X
∑
w′∈W p(x,w
′, z′). Then, (α∗, β∗) con-
stitutes an equilibrium.
Proof: If the receiver does not use the transmitted mes-
sage Y , the sender’s best policy is to minimize I(Y ;W ),
which is achieved by employing a uniform distribution on
Y [14]. Furthermore, if the sender’s message is independent
of (Z,W ), the receiver’s best policy is to set her estimate to
be equal to the element with maximum ex ante likelihood.
The messages passed at a babbling equilibrium are mean-
ingless and do not contain any information. In what follows,
Algorithm 1 The best-response dynamics for learning an
equilibrium.
Require: α0 ∈ A, β0 ∈ B
1: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: if k is even then
3: αk ∈ arg minα∈A U(α, βk−1)
4: βk ← βk−1
5: else
6: βk ∈ arg minβ∈B V (αk−1, β)
7: αk ← αk−1
8: end if
9: end for
we propose methods for capturing other equilibria of the game.
To do so, we need to define a useful concept.
Definition 2: (Potential Game [15], [16]): The privacy game
admits a potential function Ψ : A×B → R if
V (α, β)− V (α, β′) = Ψ(α, β)−Ψ(α, β′),
U(α, β)− U(α′, β) = Ψ(α, β)−Ψ(α′, β),
for all α, α′ ∈ A and β, β′ ∈ B. If the game admits a potential
function, it is a potential game.
The following simple, yet useful, lemma proves that the
presented communication game admits a potential function.
Lemma 2 (Potential Game): The privacy game admits the
potential function Ψ(α, β) = ξ(α, β) + %ζ(α).
Proof: First, note that, for the receiver, we have
V (α, β)−V (α, β′) = ξ(α, β)−ξ(α, β′) = Ψ(α, β)−Ψ(α, β′),
and
U(α, β)− U(α′, β) = ξ(α, β) + %ζ(α)− ξ(α′, β)− %ζ(α′)
= Ψ(α, β)−Ψ(α′, β).
for all α, α′ ∈ A and β, β′ ∈ B.
The result of Lemma 2 provides the following numerical
method for constructing an equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 3: Any (α∗, β∗) ∈ arg min(α,β)∈A×B Ψ(α, β)
constitutes an equilibrium of the game.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma 2.1 in [16].
Theorem 3 paves the way for constructing numerical meth-
ods to find an equilibrium of the game. This can be done
by employing the various numerical optimization methods to
minimize the potential function. However, this is a difficult
task as the potential function is not convex (it is only convex
in each variable separately and not in both variables simulta-
neously). We can simplify the construction of an equilibrium
of the game for the special case where the transmitted message
Y and the to-be-estimated variable X span over the same set.
Theorem 4: Assume that Y = X . Let β′ be such that
β′xˆy = 1 if xˆ = y and β
′
xˆy = 0 if xˆ 6= y. Moreover, let
α′ ∈ arg minα∈A[ξ(α, β′) +%ζ(α)]. Then, (α′, β′) constitutes
an equilibrium of the game.
Proof: Note that β′ means that Xˆ = Y with probability
one, i.e., no data precessing is performed at the receiver.
Clearly, if Xˆ = Y , the sender finds α′ so that Y minimizes
E{d(X,Y )}+ %I(W ;Y ). By definition, this is equivalent of
4saying that α′ ∈ arg minα∈A[ξ(α, β′) + %ζ(α)]. In the rest of
the proof, we show that the best response of the receiver is to
use β′. We do this by reductio ad absurdum. Assume that there
exists Xˆ constructed according to the conditional distribution
P{Xˆ = xˆ|Y = y} = βxˆy , for all xˆ, y ∈ X , such that
E{d(X, Xˆ)} < E{d(X,Y )} (because otherwise the receiver
sticks to β′). Following the data processing inequality from
Theorem 2.8.1 [14, p. 34], we have I(W ; Xˆ) ≤ I(W ;Y ).
This shows that E{d(X, Xˆ)} + %I(W ; Xˆ) < E{d(X,Y )} +
%I(W ;Y ). This is evidently in contradiction with the optimal-
ity of α′.
Remark 1: The proof of Theorem 4 reveals that the
sender’s policy is the solution of the optimization problem
minα∈A E{d(X,Y )}+%I(W ;Y ). This problem is equivalent
with solving minα∈A:I(W ;Y )≤ϑ E{d(X,Y )} where ϑ is an
appropriate function of %. Therefore, intuitively, the sender
aims at providing an accurate measurement of the state X
while bounding the amount of the leaked information.
For more general cases, we can use a distributed learning
algorithm to recover an equilibrium. An example of such
a learning algorithm is the iterative best-response dynamics.
Following this, we can construct Algorithm 1 to recover an
equilibrium of the game distributedly. To present our results,
we need to introduce a more practical notion of equilibrium.
Definition 3: (-Nash Equilibrium): For all  > 0, a pair
(α∗, β∗) ∈ A × B constitutes an -Nash equilibrium of the
privacy game if (α∗, β∗) ∈ N with
N = {(α, β) ∈ A×B |U(α, β) ≤ U(α′, β) + ,∀α′ ∈ A
V (α, β) ≤ V (α, β′) + ,∀β′ ∈ B}.
This notion of equilibrium means that each player cannot
gain by more than  from unilaterally changing her actions,
which is a practical notion if the act of changing her actions
has “some cost” for the player. Now, we are ready to prove
that Algorithm 1 can extract an -Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5: For {(αk, βk)}k∈N generated by Algorithm 1
and all  > 0, there exists K ∈ N such that (αk, βk) ∈ N
for all k ≥ K.
Proof: The proof is done by reductio ad absurdum. To
do so, assume that there exists an increasing subsequence
{kz}z∈N such that (αkz , βkz ) /∈ N,∀z ∈ N. If (αk, βk) /∈ N
for some k ≥ 3, at least one of the following cases hold.
• Case 1 (∃α′ ∈ A : U(αk, βk) > U(α′, βk) +  and k is
even): This means that βk = βk−1. Thus, we know that there
exists α′ ∈ A such that U(α′, βk−1) < U(αk, βk−1)− . This
is in contradiction with Line 3 of Algorithm 1 and, thus, will
never occur.
• Case 2 (∃α′ ∈ A : U(αk, βk) > U(α′, βk) +  and k is
odd): In this case, we have
Ψ(αk+1, βk+1)−Ψ(αk, βk)
= Ψ(αk+1, βk)−Ψ(αk, βk)
= U(αk+1, βk)− U(αk, βk) k + 1 is even
≤ U(α′, βk)− U(αk, βk) Line 3 in Algorithm 1
< −.
• Case 3 (∃β′ ∈ B : V (αk, βk) > V (αk, β′) +  and k is
even): In this case, we have
Ψ(αk+1, βk+1)−Ψ(αk, βk)
= Ψ(αk, βk+1)−Ψ(αk, βk)
= V (αk, βk+1)− V (αk, βk) k + 1 is odd
≤ V (αk, β′)− V (αk, βk) Line 6 in Algorithm 1
< −.
• Case 4 (∃β′ ∈ B : V (αk, βk) > V (αk, β′) +  and k
is odd): This means that αk = αk−1. Further, we know that
there exists β′ ∈ A such that V (αk−1, β′) < V (αk−1, βk)−.
This is in contradiction with Line 6 of Algorithm 1 and, thus,
will never occur.
From combining Cases 1–4, we know that if (αk, βk) /∈ N
for some k ≥ 3, then Ψ(αk+1, βk+1)−Ψ(αk, βk) < −. Note
that, in general, by construction of Line 3 in Algorithm 1, if
k is an even number, we get
Ψ(αk, βk)−Ψ(αk−1, βk−1)
= U(αk, βk−1)− U(αk−1, βk−1) ≤ 0. (3)
Similarly, by construction of Line 6 in Algorithm 1, if k is an
odd number, we have
Ψ(αk, βk)−Ψ(αk−1, βk−1)
= V (αk−1, βk)− V (αk−1, βk−1) ≤ 0. (4)
Therefore, we can deduce that
lim
k→∞
Ψ(αk, βk)=Ψ(α0, β0) +
∑
t∈N∪{0}
[Ψ(αt+1, βt+1)−Ψ(αt, βt)]
≤−
∑
z∈N:kz≥3
[Ψ(αkz+1, βkz+1)−Ψ(αkz , βkz )]
=−∞,
which is in contradiction with that limk→∞Ψ(αk, βk) exists,
because, by (3) and (4), {Ψ(αk, βk)}k∈N is a monotone
decreasing sequence and is lower bounded by zero.
Theorem 5 shows that Algorithm 1 converges to an -Nash
equilibrium, for any  > 0, in a finite number of iterations. We
can slightly tweak Algorithm 1 to also present bounds on the
required number of iterations to extract an -Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6: For {(αk, βk)}k∈N generated by Algorithm 2
and all  > 0, (αk, βk) ∈ N for all k ≥ 3 + Ψ(α0, β0)/.
Proof: Algorithm 2 makes sure that (αk, βk) =
(αk−1, βk−1) if (αk, βk) ∈ N. Therefore, there exists K
such that (αk, βk) /∈ N for k ≤ K − 1 and (αk, βk) ∈ N
for k ≥ K. Now, following the reasoning of the proof of
Theorem 5, we can see that
Ψ(αK , βK) =Ψ(α2, β2) +
K−1∑
t=2
[Ψ(αt+1, βt+1)−Ψ(αt, βt)]
≤Ψ(α2, β2)−(K − 3)≤Ψ(α0, β0)− (K − 3),
where the last inequality follows from that Ψ(αk, βk) is a
decreasing sequence. Noting that Ψ(αK , βK) ≥ 0 because
of the properties of the mutual information and expected
estimation error, we can see that K ≤ 3 + Ψ(α0, β0)/.
5Algorithm 2 The best-response dynamics for learning an
equilibrium.
Require: α0 ∈ A, β0 ∈ B
1: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: if k is even then
3: α′ ∈ arg minα∈A U(α, βk−1)
4: if U(αk−1, βk−1)− U(α′, βk−1) >  then
5: αk ← α′
6: else
7: αk ← αk−1
8: end if
9: βk ← βk−1
10: else
11: βk ∈ arg minβ∈B V (αk−1, β)
12: if V (αk−1, βk−1)− V (αk−1, β′) >  then
13: βk ← β′
14: else
15: βk ← βk−1
16: end if
17: αk ← αk−1
18: end if
19: end for
R
S1
S2
...
Y1
Yn
Xˆ
(Z1,W1)
(Zn,Wn)
Fig. 2. Communication structure between the senders S1, . . . , Sn and the
receiver R.
IV. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE SENDERS
Here, we extend the results to the case where sender Si,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, for some n ≥ 2, communicate with the receiver R.
Similarly, the receiver wants to have an accurate measurement
of a random variable X ∈ X . We assume that sender i has
access to a possibly noisy measurement of the state denoted
by Zi ∈ X . The private information of the senders is denoted
by Wi ∈ Wi. The senders would like to transmit a message
Yi ∈ Yi that contains useful information about the measured
state Zi while minimizing the amount of the leaked private
information. Let N = {1, . . . , n}.
Assumption 2: The random variables X, (Zi)i∈N, (Wi)i∈N
are distributed according to a joint probability distribution p :
X × Xn × ∏i∈NWi → [0, 1], i.e., P{X = x, (Zi)i∈N =
(zi)i∈N, (Wi)i∈N = (wi)i∈N} = p(x, (zi)i∈N, (wi)i∈N) for
all (x, (zi)i∈N, (wi)i∈N) ∈ X × Xn ×
∏
i∈NWi.
Similarly, the receiver constructs its best estimate Xˆ ∈ X
using the conditional distribution P{Xˆ = xˆ|(Yi)i∈N =
(yi)i∈N} = βxˆy1...yn for all (xˆ, (yi)i∈N) ∈ X ×
∏
i∈N Yi.
The tensor β = (βxˆy1...yn)(xˆ,(yi)i∈N)∈X×
∏
i∈N Yi ∈ B′ is the
policy of the receiver with the set of feasible policies defined as
B′ =
{
β :βxˆy1...yn ∈ [0, 1],∀(xˆ, (yi)i∈N) ∈ X ×
∏
i∈N
Yi
and
∑
xˆ∈X
βxˆy1...yn = 1,∀(yi)i∈N ∈
∏
i∈N
Yi
}
.
Algorithm 3 The best-response dynamics for learning an
equilibrium in the multi-sensor case.
Require: α(i),0 ∈ A for all i ∈ N, β0 ∈ B
1: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
2: Select j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} uniformly at random
3: if j = 0 then
4: βk ∈ arg minβ∈B′ V (β, (α(i),k−1)i∈N)
5: α(i),k ← α(i),k−1 for all i ∈ N
6: else
7: α(j),k ∈ arg minα(j) Uj(α(j), (α(i),k−1)j 6=i, βk−1)
8: α(i),k ← α(i),k−1 for all i ∈ N \ {j}
9: βk ← βk−1
10: end if
11: end for
The receiver seeks an accurate measurement of the variable
X and, hence, minimizes the cost function E{d(X, Xˆ)}.
The sender i ∈ N constructs its message yi ∈ Yi according
to the conditional probability distribution P{Y = yi|Z =
zi,W = wi} = α(i)yiziwi for all (yi, zi, wi) ∈ Yi × X × Wi.
The tensor α(i) = (α(i)yiziwi)(yi,zi,wi)∈Yi×X×Wi ∈ A′i denotes
the policy of the sender. The set of feasible policies is
A′i =
{
α(i) : α(i)yiziwi ∈ [0, 1],∀(yi, zi, wi) ∈ Yi ×X ×Wi
and
∑
yi∈Yi
α(i)yiziwi = 1,∀(zi, wi) ∈ X ×Wi
}
.
The sender wants to minimize E{d(X, Xˆ)} + %I(Yi;Wi) to
find a balance between transmitting useful information about
the measured variable and maintaining her privacy.
Remark 2: This formulation is useful when X and Wi
are uncorrelated while Zi and Wi are correlated (e.g.,
participatory-sensing mechanisms for traffic estimation). This
is because, in this formulation, the sender is only concerned
about the amount of the leaked information in her own mes-
sage I(Yi;Wi). However, if X and Wi were to be correlated,
she should have been concerned with the total amount of the
leaked information I(Y1, . . . , Yn;Wi). This is indeed the case
because the receiver can construct an accurate representation
of the state (if each sensor is only concerned about the amount
of the leaked information in her own message) and, therefore,
gain an insight into the private information of the sensors.
Following similar calculations as in Section III, the cost of
the receiver is given by
V ((α(i))i∈N, β) = E{d(X, Xˆ)} = ξ′(β, (α(i))i∈N),
where the mapping ξ′ : B′ ×∏i∈NA′i → [0, 1] is defined as
in (5), on top of the next page, for all (β, (α(i))i∈N)×B′ ×∏
i∈NA
′
i. The cost of sender j ∈ N is given by
Uj((α
(i))i∈N, β) = E{d(X, Xˆ)}+ %I(Yj ;Wj)
= ξ′(β, (α(i))i∈N) + %ζ ′j(α
(j)),
6ξ′(β, (α(i))i∈N) =
∑
(y1,z1,w1)∈Y1×X×W1
· · ·
∑
(yn,zn,wn)∈Yn×X×Wn
∑
xˆ,x∈X
d(x, xˆ)βxˆy1...yn
∏
i∈N
α(i)yiziwip(x, (zi)i∈N, (wi)i∈N) (5)
where
ζ ′j(α
(j)) =
∑
yj∈Yj
∑
wj∈Wj
P{Yj = yj ,Wj = wj}
× log
[
P{Yj = yj ,Wj = wj}
P{Yj = yj}P{Wj = wj}
]
.
Definition 4: (Nash Equilibrium): A pair ((α(i),∗)i∈N,β∗) ∈∏
i∈NA
′
i × B′ constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the privacy
game if ((α(i),∗)i∈N, β∗) ∈ N ′ with
N ′ =
{
((α(i))i∈N, β) ∈
∏
i∈N
A′i ×B′ | ∀α¯(j) ∈ A′j ,∀j ∈ N,
Uj((α
(i))i∈N, β) ≤ Uj(α¯(j), (α(i))i∈N\{j}, β),
V ((α(i))i∈N, β) ≤ V ((α(i))i∈N, β¯),∀β¯ ∈ B′
}
.
Definition 5: (Potential Game): The defined game admits a
potential function Ψ′ :
∏
i∈NA
′
i ×B′ → R if
V ((α(i))i∈N, β)− V ((α(i))i∈N, β¯)
= Ψ′((α(i))i∈N, β)−Ψ((α(i))i∈N, β¯),
Uj((α
(i))i∈N, β)− Uj(α¯(j), (α(i))i∈N\{j}, β)
= Ψ′((α(i))i∈N, β)−Ψ(α¯(j), (α(i))i∈N\{j}, β),
for all ((α(i))i∈N, β) ∈
∏
i∈NA
′
i × B′, α¯(j) ∈ A′j , j ∈ N,
and β¯ ∈ B′. If the game admits a potential function, it is a
potential game.
Lemma 7: The game admits the potential function
Ψ′((α(i))i∈N, β) = ξ′(β, (α(i))i∈N) + %
∑
i∈N ζi(α
(i)).
Proof: The proof of this lemma is, mutatis mutandis,
similar to that of Lemma 2.
Theorem 8: Any ((α(i)∗)i∈N, β∗) in
arg min((α(i))i∈N,β)∈
∏
i∈N A
′
i×B′ Ψ
′((α(i))i∈N, β) constitutes
an equilibrium of the game.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemma 2.1 in [16].
Definition 6: (-Nash Equilibrium): For all  > 0, a pair
((α(i),∗)i∈N, β∗) ∈
∏
i∈NA
′
i × B′ constitutes an -Nash
equilibrium of the privacy game if ((α(i),∗)i∈N, β∗) ∈ N ′
with
N ′ =
{
((α(i))i∈N, β) ∈
∏
i∈N
A′i ×B′ | ∀α¯(j) ∈ A′j ,∀j ∈ N,
Uj((α
(i))i∈N, β)≤Uj(α¯(j), (α(i))i∈N\{j}, β)+,
V ((α(i))i∈N, β) ≤ V ((α(i))i∈N, β¯) + ,∀β¯ ∈ B
}
.
In the multi-sensor case, we can use Algorithm 3 to recover
an equilibrium of the game using an iterative best-response
dynamics.
Theorem 9: For {((α(i),k)i∈N, βk)}k∈N generated by Algo-
rithm 3 and all  > 0, limk→∞ P{((α(i),k)i∈N, βk)∈N} = 1.
Proof: The proof is done by reductio ad absurdum. To
do so, assume that there exists an increasing subsequence
{kz}z∈N and a constant δ > 0 such that P{(αkz , βkz ) /∈
N ′} > δ for all z ∈ N. First, note that, with a sim-
ilar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5, we can
show that, for all k ∈ N, Ψ′((α(i),k+1)i∈N, βk+1) −
Ψ′((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) ≤ 0. Now, if (αk, βk) /∈ N ′ then,
either ∃` ∈ N,∃α¯` ∈ A′` : U`((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) >
U`(α¯
(`), (α(i),k)i∈N\{`}, βk) +  for some ` ∈ N or ∃β¯ ∈
B′ : V ((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) > V ((α(i),k)i∈N, β¯) + . If ∃β¯ ∈
B′ : V ((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) > V ((α(i),k)i∈N, β¯)+ and if j = 0,
we get that Ψ′((α(i),k+1)i∈N, βk+1)−Ψ′((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) <
−. Therefore, if ∃β¯ ∈ B′ : V ((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) >
V ((α(i),k)i∈N, β¯) + , the inequality in (6), on top of the next
page, holds. Similarly, if ∃α¯` ∈ A′` : U`((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) >
U`(α¯
(`), (α(i),k)i∈N\{`}, βk) +  and if j = `, we get that
Ψ′((α(i),k+1)i∈N, βk+1) − Ψ′((α(i),k)i∈N, βk) < −, which
leads to the inequality (6). Notice that
lim
k→∞
E{Ψ((α(i),k)i∈N, βk)}
=E{Ψ((α(i),0)i∈N, β0)}
+
∞∑
t=0
E{Ψ((α(i),t+1)i∈N, βt+1)−Ψ((α(i),t)i∈N, βt)}
≤E{Ψ((α(i),0)i∈N, β0)}
− /(n+ 1)
∞∑
z=0
P{((α(i),kz )i∈N, βkz ) /∈ N ′}
=−∞.
This is in contradiction with that limk→∞ E{Ψ(αk, βk)} ex-
ists and is greater than or equal to zero. Thus, we have proved
that limk→∞ P{(αk, βk) /∈ N ′} = 0.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider an example with X = W = Y = {1, . . . , 5}.
Assume that Z = X , i.e., the sender has access to the perfect
measurement of X . Moreover, let
(P{X = x,W =w})x∈X ,w∈W
=

0.14 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.02 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.02
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14
 .
This distribution implies that there is a reasonable correlation
between X and W . Therefore, for high enough %, we expect a
very bad estimation quality (at the receiver) since, otherwise,
the receiver can recover X , which carries a significant amount
of information about W .
For this example, we use the results of Theorem 4 extract a
nontrivial equilibrium for each %. Fig. 3 (top) illustrate the es-
timation error E{d(X, Xˆ)} as a function of the privacy ratio %.
As we expect, by increasing %, the sender puts more emphasis
on protecting her privacy rather than providing a useful mea-
surement to the receiver and, therefore, E{d(X, Xˆ)} increases.
7E{Ψ′((α(i),k+1)i∈N, βk+1)−Ψ′((α(i),k)i∈N, βk)}=
n∑
q=0
E{Ψ′((α(i),k+1)i∈N, βk+1)−Ψ′((α(i),k)i∈N, βk)|j = q}P{j = q}
< −/(n+ 1). (6)
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Fig. 3. Expected estimation error E{d(X, Xˆ)} and mutual information
I(Y ;W ) at the extracted equilibrium versus the privacy ratio %.
Fig. 3 (bottom) shows the mutual information I(Y ;W ) as a
function of the privacy ratio %. Evidently, with increasing %,
the amount of leaked information about the private information
of the sender decreases. In both figures, there seems to be
sudden change when the privacy ratio passes the critical value
% = 0.38. That is, for all % < 0.38, the truth-telling seems
to be an equilibrium of the game; however, if % > 0.38, the
sender adds false reports to protects her privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
We developed a game-theoretic framework to investigate the
effect of privacy in the quality of the measurements provided
by a well-informed sender to a receiver. We used a privacy
ratio to model the sender’s emphasis on protecting her privacy.
Equilibria of the game were constructed. We proposed learning
algorithms for recovering an equilibrium. Future work can
focus on extending the results to dynamic estimation problems.
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